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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1960, the Journal of the American Medical Association published 
an article describing a surprisingly simple and remarkably effective life-
saving technique.1  The technique, now known as cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR), enabled medical professionals to “restor[e] 
spontaneous circulation” to patients suffering from cardiac arrest.2  Once 
administration of CPR became standard procedure, however, medical 
professionals recognized that it may not always be in a patient’s interest 
to attempt resuscitation.3  Rather, resuscitating a terminal patient already 
near death may cause the patient to endure a painful last few days of life.  
Recognizing this, doctors and nurses looked for a way to curb the 
unnecessary “suffering inflicted on many terminally ill patients by 
repeated resuscitation attempts that only prolonged death.”4 
Hospital staffs adopted “procedures to delay or deny resuscitation 
attempts in situations in which they believed CPR would not be 
beneficial.”5  Doctors designated certain patients for “less-than-full” 
resuscitation attempts; word of mouth or symbols on a patient’s chart 
                                                        
*  J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Kansas School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Kansas 
Department of Philosophy; B.A. University of Dallas.  I would like to thank Mathew Petersen, Haley 
Claxton, Nick Snow, Nancy Musick and the University of Kansas Law Review staff for their 
thoughtful comments and careful review of this Note.  Special thanks to my wife Erin and her unfailing 
patience. 
 1.   W. B. Kouwenhoven, James R. Jude & G. Guy Knickerbocker, Closed-Chest Cardiac 
Massage, 173 JAMA 1064 (1960); See also Joan White, Closed-Chest Cardiac Massage, 61 AM. J. 
NURSING 57, 57 (1961) (noting that “[a]nyone can learn the new lifesaving measure”). 
 2.   Jeffrey P. Burns & Robert D. Truog, The DNR Order After 40 Years, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
504, 504 (2016). 
 3.   See id. at 505 (“Today, the decision about whether to attempt resuscitation is just one of 
many salient decisions that physicians are encouraged to discuss with patients and their surrogates 
with regard to desired end-of-life care.”). 
 4.   Id. at 504. 
 5.   Id. at 504–05. 
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would indicate the level of treatment recommended.6  As noted by Jeffrey 
Burns and Robert Truog: 
Many physicians became increasingly concerned that the absence of an 
established policy and a procedure for transparent decision making about 
resuscitation prevented them from obtaining adequate informed consent 
from the patient or the patient’s family—and meant that hospitals and 
clinicians were failing to provide and document a sufficient rationale and 
accept accountability for what did or did not transpire.7 
In short, medical professionals often chose, on their own initiative, which 
patients’ lives were worth saving.  The American Medical Association, 
attempting to combat this morally, legally, and ethically dubious practice, 
recommended that physicians indicate orders not to resuscitate on their 
order sheets and in a patient’s progress notes.8  Medical professionals were 
encouraged to discuss resuscitation decisions with patients and their 
families in advance.9  Thus, a physician’s “do not resuscitate order,” 
adopted by hospitals and recognized in most states, is an attempt to ensure 
that the patient—or the patient’s caregivers—can decide for themselves 
whether resuscitation should be attempted. 
Yet not all patients can make these decisions.  Few states recognize a 
minor’s right to refuse medical treatment.  And recent Kansas legislation 
on do not resuscitate orders (DNRs) for minors seems to ignore the fact 
that minors—especially those who understand the nature and 
consequences of a DNR or similar physician’s order—may disagree with 
their parents about what, if any, medical care they should receive.10  This 
recent legislation, known as “Simon’s Law,” presents a bigger question: 
whether a minor has the right—under either the U.S. Constitution or 
Kansas law—to unilaterally refuse resuscitation and medical treatment. 
Scholars have argued that minors—at least those of a sufficient level 
of maturity—should have the freedom to refuse medical treatment against 
the wishes of their parents.11  A cursory glance at Supreme Court precedent 
                                                        
 6.   Id. at 505. 
 7.   Id. 
 8.   Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC), 
227 SUPPLEMENT TO JAMA 837, 864 (1974). 
 9.   Burns & Truog, supra note 2, at 505. 
 10.   See S.B. 85, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2017). 
 11.   See, e.g., Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Huevel, Mature Minors Should Have the 
Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109 (2000); Jennifer L. 
Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right to Make Decisions Regarding 
Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996); Jonathan F. Will, My God My Choice: The 
Mature Minor Doctrine and Adolescent Refusal of Life-Saving or Sustaining Medical Treatment Based 
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and Kansas common law might lead one to conclude that a minor’s right 
to refuse treatment is protected by the U.S. Constitution and state law.  
Such a conclusion, however, is mistaken.  Rather, granting a minor the 
right to refuse medical treatment, against the wishes of the parents, would 
undermine the moral order and authority of the family.12  Parents’ natural 
(i.e. pre-political) duty to make decisions for the good of the family is 
protected by the U.S. Constitution, and when properly understood, there is 
no reason that a minor’s interest in refusing medical treatment should 
outweigh this duty.13  Moreover, advocates for minors’ right to refuse 
treatment often neglect the important difference between consenting to an 
arguably beneficial procedure and refusing to consent to such a 
procedure.14  This Note therefore argues that a minor’s ability to refuse 
medical treatment is protected by neither the U.S. Constitution nor Kansas 
law, and that protecting a minor’s ability to refuse treatment is contrary to 
sound public policy upholding traditional parental rights and duties. 
In Part II of this Note, I will primarily examine the legal basis upon 
which advocates for minors’ right to refuse treatment build their 
arguments.  As both the U.S. Constitution and Kansas law provide a 
plausible (but ultimately insufficient) basis for this right, I will examine 
these two sources insofar as they can be used to advance a minor’s interest 
in refusing treatment.  In Part III, I will then show why the argument in 
favor of a minor’s right to refuse medical treatment is flawed.  As it turns 
out, advocates for a minor’s right to refuse treatment misconstrue the 
nature of parental rights and they interpret constitutional and state case law 
far more liberally than is warranted given the actual considerations 
involved.  In addition, much of the empirical data about adolescent 
psychology relied upon in favor of a minor’s right to refuse treatment is 
far from compelling (as the Supreme Court itself implied in Roper v. 
Simmons (2005)).15  My conclusion, therefore, is that there need be no 
right for “mature minors” to refuse medical treatment against the wishes 
                                                        
Upon Religious Beliefs, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 236 (2006) (“The so-called mature 
minor doctrine is based on a seemingly simple principle: minors who demonstrate a sufficient level of 
maturity ought to have their choices respected independent of third parties.”). 
 12.   See infra Part III.B. 
 13.   See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (upholding parents’ right to 
inculcate “moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship”); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that “the child is not 
the mere creature of the State”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“[I]t is the natural duty 
of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.”). 
 14.   For an example of this argument in case law, see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
 15.   See infra note 94. 
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of the parents, and that the current arguments made in favor of such a right 
are misguided. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The legal argument in favor of a mature minor’s right to refuse 
medical treatment is ultimately grounded on two bodies of law: (1) law 
that establishes an adult’s protected interest in refusing medical treatment, 
and (2) law that establishes a mature minor’s right (in certain 
circumstances) to consent to medical treatment.16  A minor’s right to refuse 
medical treatment does not obviously follow from these two established 
bodies of law. But scholars argue that a natural and logical expansion of 
these principles yield the conclusion that mature minors, at least in certain 
circumstances, have or should have a protected interest in refusing medical 
treatment. In this section, I will present the constitutional and common-
law basis for this line of reasoning.  Despite its initial plausibility, this line 
of reasoning is ultimately flawed, as it fails to recognize natural parental 
rights, undeveloped adolescent moral character, unclear empirical data, 
and other important considerations. 
In Part II.A of this Note, I will explain the general right of adults to 
refuse medical treatment.  Next, in Part II.B.1, I will explain the right of 
minors to consent to medical treatment under the Constitution.  In Parts 
II.B.2-3, I will then examine the ways in which states, particularly Kansas, 
permit minors to consent to their own healthcare decisions.  Finally, in Part 
II.C, I will provide a brief explanation of Simon’s Law, which places the 
decision to refuse the resuscitation of a minor solely in the hands of the 
parents. 
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
The justification behind legally permitting and regulating DNR orders 
is simple: people have autonomy over their bodies, and may therefore 
                                                        
 16.   Presumably minors do have the right to consent to life-saving medical treatment even if the 
parents would have it otherwise.  After all, (1) life is clearly an intelligible, substantive good, whereas 
continued illness and ultimate death is not, and (2) minors have the right to consent to abortion and 
birth control over parental objection, and abortion and birth control—whatever their moral status—
are far less important than the life itself which continued medical treatment would further.  If minors 
can consent to morally contested medical treatment (e.g. abortion and birth control) against their 
parents’ wishes, then it stands to reason that minors can consent to less controversial procedures which 
preserve life itself.  When this line of reasoning is combined with the common-law “mature minor 
exception,” see infra, Part II.B.2, it appears that a minor’s right to consent to medical treatment against 
parental wishes is on surer footing than the right to refuse treatment. 
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choose whether to allow a physician to work on them.17  At common law, 
merely touching another without consent or legal justification is a 
battery.18  As Judge Cardozo explained: “Every human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”19  No 
doctor—absent special circumstances—can treat a patient without 
informed consent.  Doing so would violate the “sacred [and] . . . carefully 
guarded” right to the “possession and control of his own person.”20 
Thus, the doctrine of informed consent lies behind any right to refuse 
treatment.21  Without informed consent, no medical treatment is permitted.  
Decades before the widespread use of DNR orders, the Kansas Supreme 
Court recognized the right to forgo medical treatment—even life-saving 
medical treatment.  It noted, in passing: 
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self 
determination.  It follows that each man is considered to be master of his 
own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the 
performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment.  A doctor 
might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or 
necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment 
for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.22 
A doctor therefore cannot unilaterally decide to treat a patient without 
thereby violating the patient’s right to self-determination and control over 
his body.23 
This right, within the past few decades, has been protected by statute 
in most jurisdictions.24  In Kansas, for example, the Natural Death Act 
                                                        
 17.   GERMAIN GRISEZ & JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR., LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: 
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE, 87–88 (1979). 
 18.   Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (citing W. KEETON ET. AL, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39–42 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 19.   Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by 
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957), superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d 
(McKinney 2012), as recognized in Starozytnyk v. Reich, 871 A.2d 733 (2005). 
 20.   Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 21.   Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. 
 22.   Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960). 
 23.   There are exceptions in emergency situations.  However, the legal justification for this is 
telling, as it treats the incapacitated patient as giving implied consent, thereby rendering treatment 
consistent with the general rule.  See, e.g., Cecil Casterline, Comment, Informed Consent: 
Malpractice, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 138 (1966) (noting that “in emergency situations, where 
consent is implied, the duty to make disclosures [to the patient about risks of treatment] never arises”). 
 24.   Living Wills, 0160 Surveys 4 (Thompson Reuters 2017). 
 
690 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
protects an adult’s “fundamental right to control the decisions relating to 
the rendering of [his or her] own medical care, including the decision to 
have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
terminal condition.”25  Yet, in most states, this right is statutorily protected 
only for adults; generally speaking, unemancipated minors do not have a 
statutory right to refuse medical treatment.26 
In addition to the various statutory protections created by state 
legislatures, an adult has a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment.  The Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. 
Director of Missouri Department of Health, held that the Due Process 
Clause protects a patient’s “right not to consent, that is, to refuse 
treatment.”27  Like all liberty interests, however, the scope of 
constitutional protection depends on the nature and extent of other 
counterbalancing state interests.28  In Cruzan, the Court held that one’s 
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment must be weighed against a 
state’s interest in “the preservation of life, the protection of the interests of 
innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession . . . .”29  At the same time, 
the Court noted that 
[o]n balance, the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any 
countervailing state interests, and competent persons generally are 
permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of death.  Most of 
the cases that have held otherwise, unless they involved the interest in 
protecting innocent third parties, have concerned the patient’s 
competency to make a rational and considered choice.30 
States may impose limitations on the right to refuse medical treatment, it 
seems, primarily to protect third-parties and those not competent to make 
rational decisions.31 
Because unemancipated minors remain in the custody of their parents 
or guardians (i.e. third parties), and because minors are generally 
recognized to have less capacity for rational decision making than adults, 
                                                        
 25.   Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101–28,120 (2002 & Supp. 2017). 
 26.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103 (2002) (granting right to refuse medical treatment to 
“[a]ny adult”). 
 27.   Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990). 
 28.   Id. at 279. 
 29.   Id. at 271. 
 30.   Id. at 273 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985)). 
 31.   See, e.g., id. at 284 (upholding Missouri’s requirement that “clear and convincing” evidence 
be shown of an incapacitated adult’s desire to withhold medical treatment). 
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a state would presumably have a stronger interest in limiting a minor’s 
right to refuse medical treatment.  This interest is arguably strengthened 
by the heightened danger of teenage suicide.  Yet the Court has, in a few 
instances, held that constitutional protection of liberty interests does not 
depend on the age of those seeking its protection.32  Additionally, scholars 
have, for the past few decades, argued that the right of a “mature minor”—
a minor whose decision-making capacity is not in serious question—to 
refuse medical treatment outweighs the interests of third parties, and as 
such should be afforded the same rights and protections as adults who 
refuse medical treatment.33  These arguments for a minor’s ability to refuse 
resuscitation and medical treatment are presented in the following 
sections. 
B. A Minor’s Right to Consent to Medical Treatment 
Many states, including Kansas, have both statutory and common-law 
exceptions to the general rule that minors cannot consent to medical 
treatment.34  Likewise, the Constitution protects a minor’s interest in 
consenting to certain kinds of medical treatment.35  Scholars have argued 
that, because both state and constitutional law protect a minor’s ability to 
consent to medical treatment (at least in some circumstances), state and 
constitutional law also protect—or ought to protect—a minor’s ability to 
refuse medical treatment.36  As one scholar notes: “Clearly, there is an 
intimate relationship between consenting . . . and refusing to consent to 
treatment.  Courts and commentators generally agree that if the patient’s 
right to ‘informed consent’ is to have any meaning, it must encompass the 
right to refuse to consent.”37  But this argument is not obviously sound; 
rather, the persuasiveness of the argument depends on the rationale behind 
the state and constitutional protections, which I will expound upon below.  
Ultimately, this argument fails to fully recognize the difference between 
                                                        
 32.   Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
 33.   See, e.g., Derish & Vanden Huevel, supra note 11; Rosato, supra note 11; Will, supra note 
11, at 236 (“The so-called mature minor doctrine is based on a seemingly simple principle: minors 
who demonstrate a sufficient level of maturity ought to have their choices respected independent of 
third parties.”). 
 34.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705 (Supp. 2017); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of 
Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1970). 
 35.   See generally Danforth, 428 U.S 52 (protecting minors’ interests in abortion). 
 36.   See, e.g., Will, supra note 11, at 236 (adding a first-amendment religious freedom 
argument). 
 37.   Alexander M. Capron, TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 18.01[1][b] (2017) (emphasis 
added). 
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minor and adult decision-making, including the decision to refuse medical 
treatment. 
1. The Constitution and a Minor’s Interest in Consenting to Medical 
Treatment 
According to Cruzan, every “competent person” has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.38  If a 
minor is found to be a competent person, then it seems to follow that his 
or her interests would enjoy the same protections.  Advocates for a minor’s 
right to refuse medical treatment put great weight on the fact that the 
Constitution protects a minor’s interest in unilaterally consenting to 
medical treatment.39  The protection of a minor’s ability to consent, it 
might be argued, supports the protection of a minor’s ability to refuse to 
consent. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, for example, 
the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a law requiring 
unmarried minors to obtain parental consent before obtaining an 
abortion.40  After noting that women have a constitutionally-protected 
liberty interest in terminating a pregnancy, the Court held that a protected 
liberty interest “do[es] not mature and come into being magically only 
when one attains the state-defined age of majority.”41  Whether one is of 
majority or minority age status does not impact whether, for example, a 
state can give third parties “an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over 
the decision of the physician and his patient.”42 
At the same time, however, the Court recognized that “the State has 
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of 
adults.”43  While the State does have the right to act for the sake of minors 
who cannot act or themselves and who lack adequate caretakers under the 
doctrine of parens patriae, the people charged by both nature and the law 
with the welfare of minors are the minors’ parents.44 
                                                        
 38.   Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
 39.   See Jennifer Fouts Skeels, Note, In re E.G.: The Right of Mature Minors in Illinois to Refuse 
Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 21 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1199, 1210–11 (1990) (analyzing federal 
constitutional law and Illinois case law). 
 40.   See generally Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 
(1990) (examining the constitutionality of a law requiring two-parent notice before a minor obtains an 
abortion). 
 41.   Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–603 (1979) (holding that “[o]ur jurisprudence 
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This involves a recognition that children ought to have their welfare 
looked after, often in ways that may curtail their freedom.  While the 
parents have the natural obligation to protect the welfare of their children, 
the State may also exercise its parens patriae right to act on behalf of 
children who cannot act for themselves. 
In effect, the Court must weigh the minor’s liberty interest against 
“[t]hree separate but related interests—the interest in the welfare of the . . . 
minor, the interest of the parents, and the interest of the family unit.”45  The 
State has an interest in the welfare of the minor, because a minor’s 
“immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair 
their ability to exercise their rights wisely.”46  This becomes an especially 
pressing concern with respect to refusing medical treatment, as there is a 
very fine line between refusing medical treatment and suicide—a line 
arguably more difficult to recognize and properly respond to for minors 
than for adults.47  And since the avoidance of suicide is one of the factors 
in Cruzan that weighs against one’s interest in refusing medical treatment, 
great caution should be exercised when advocating for a minor’s right to 
refuse medical treatment.48  It should also be noted that the State has an 
interest in the parents, who in turn have an interest in making “choices 
concerning the arrangement of the household,” and who generally make 
decisions that are in their children’s best interests.49  Finally, the State has 
                                                        
historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental 
authority over minor children,” and that a “state is not without constitutional control over parental 
discretion dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized”); see also P.W. 
v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 877 P.2d 430, 435–36 (Kan. 1994) (explaining the scope of 
Kansas’ parens patriae doctrine). 
 45.   Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444; see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (weighing a state’s interest in 
“the safeguarding of the family unit and of parental authority” against a minor’s liberty interest in 
terminating a pregnancy). 
 46.   Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444 (citations omitted). 
 47.   See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294–99 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“It is not surprising . . . that the early cases considering the claimed right to refuse medical 
treatment dismissed as specious the nice distinction between ‘passively submitting to death and 
actively seeking it.  The distinction may be merely verbal, as it would be if an adult sought death by 
starvation instead of a drug.’” (quoting John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 672–
73 (N.J. 1971))). 
 48.   Id. at 279 (majority opinion) (holding that the state’s interest in preventing suicide must be 
weighed against a patient’s interest in refusing treatment). 
 49.   Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 447; see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“The law’s concept of the 
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and 
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.  More important, historically it 
has been recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their 
children.” (citations omitted)); see also Will, supra note 11, at 236 (citing ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & 
DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 29 (1989) 
(giving four reasons why parents are the proper surrogate decision makers for their children). 
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an interest in the family unit, which provides the primary locus of care, 
nurture, responsibilities, and moral formation within society.50  Such 
considerations, then, must be weighed against the Supreme Court’s dictum 
that a protected liberty interest “do[es] not mature and come into being 
magically when one attains the state-defined age of majority.”51  However, 
as will be seen below, the considerations against a minor’s interest in 
refusing medical treatment prevail. 
2. Kansas Common Law Mature Minor Exceptions 
Many states recognize a common-law “mature minor” exception, 
which permits minors to consent to medical treatment without their 
parent’s permission.52  In one of the paradigm cases, Younts v. St. Francis 
Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., a seventeen-year-old girl severely 
injured her hand while visiting her mother in the hospital.53  Doctors 
rushed her into surgery without obtaining her mother’s consent to 
operate.54  The mother argued that an unauthorized operation of this sort 
is a “technical battery or trespass, regardless of the result,” because a 
minor is incapable of giving informed consent.55  As such, the mother 
argued the surgeon was liable for damages.56 
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, found that in some 
circumstances, a minor may consent to medical treatment.  A minor’s 
ability to consent to medical treatment, the Court argued, depends on his 
or her “ability to understand and comprehend the nature of the surgical 
procedure, the risks involved, and the probability of attaining the desired 
results in the light of the circumstances which attend.”57  Ultimately, the 
Court held that a minor could consent to a beneficial surgical procedure if 
she understands the nature and consequences of the procedure.58  In 
applying this rule, the Court found that the daughter was “of sufficient age 
                                                        
 50.   See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (noting that the integrity of the family unit 
“found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . and the Ninth Amendment”) (citations omitted). 
 51.   Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
 52.   Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse 
Life-Saving Medical Treatment—The Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1180–81 (1996). 
 53.   469 P.2d 330, 332 (Kan. 1970). 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   Id. at 336. 
 56.   Id. 
 57.   Id. at 337. 
 58.   Id. at 338. 
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and mature” enough to understand the nature and consequences of the 
operation, and that the operation was “the approved surgical treatment and 
in the best interests of the patient.”59  Furthermore, the Court noted, the 
daughter’s physical condition demanded immediate medical attention, 
which would only have been delayed by seeking consent—thus, it was in 
the daughter’s best interests that the operation occur before obtaining 
parental consent.60 
Other jurisdictions have similar common-law rules.  The Supreme 
Court of Tennessee, for example, approvingly cited Younts while 
recognizing a “mature minor” exception in Cardwell v. Bechtol.61  A minor 
could consent to medical treatment, the Court held, if the minor had “the 
capacity to consent to and appreciate the nature, the risks, and the 
consequences of the medical treatment involved.”62  Similarly, West 
Virginia has recognized that “minors who are mature may be involved in 
the medical decisions that affect their livelihood” and that “[w]hether the 
child has the capacity to consent depends upon the age, ability, experience, 
education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the 
child, as well as upon the conduct and demeanor of the child at the time of 
the procedure or treatment.”63  Age, in such states, is therefore not the 
determining factor in whether a minor can consent to treatment. 
It is especially important to recognize, however, that the common-law 
mature minor exception was not created to advance the autonomy of 
minors.  It was primarily created to protect the interests of physicians, 
permitting them to avoid battery and malpractice charges when treating 
minors without their parents’ permission.  The exception emerged out of 
a judgment that doctors should not be liable for attending to the real and 
pressing needs of patients simply because there was neither time nor 
opportunity to obtain parental consent; it was more important that a minor 
patient be treated to avoid further damage than the doctor strictly adhere 
to the technicalities of tort law.  This history should not be lost on those 
debating whether the common-law mature minor exception gives minors 
any right of autonomy respecting their medical decision-making. 
3. Kansas Statutory Mature Minor Exceptions 
In addition to the common-law “mature minor exception,” most states 
                                                        
 59.   Id. 
 60.   Id. 
 61.   724 S.W.2d 739, 746–47 (1987) (citing id.). 
 62.   Id. at 749. 
 63.   Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 835, 838 (W. Va. 1992) (holding that 
a mature seventeen-year old’s consent is required for a DNR order). 
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have laws that permit mature minors to consent to certain kinds of medical 
treatment, typically relating to sexual health and pregnancy.  For example, 
in Kansas, a minor can unilaterally consent to an abortion, without the 
typically-required parental notice, if a court “finds by a preponderance of 
the evidence that either: (1) The minor is mature and well-informed 
enough to make the abortion decision on her own; or (2) notification of a 
[parent or guardian] would not be in the best interest of the minor.”64  The 
definition of “mature,” within this context, is not always perfectly clear.65  
Nevertheless, Kansas courts have determined that minors need not be 
“extraordinarily mature” for their age, nor need they be married or “freed 
from the care, custody and control of their parents.”66  Rather, all that is 
required is that the minor “have the intellectual capacity, experience, and 
knowledge necessary to substantially understand the situation at hand and 
the consequences of the choices that can be made.”67  Furthermore, 
because “every human act and decision can be fraught with long- and 
short-term consequences which no person can completely appreciate,” a 
minor may be mature even if his or her decisions are “made despite 
imperfect knowledge and understanding.”68 
The import of such statutory mature minor exceptions cuts two ways.  
On one hand, the existence of such statutory mature minor exceptions 
suggests an acknowledgement that many people under the age of majority 
have the intellectual capacity to consent to medical treatment.  That minors 
often have the capacity to consent to medical treatment is a central premise 
for many arguments in favor of a mature minor’s ability to refuse medical 
treatment.69  This may influence whether courts may recognize a mature 
                                                        
 64.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705 (Supp. 2017).  The statute tracks the language of Bellotti v. 
Baird, in which the Court held that a minor’s interest in an abortion outweighed a State’s interest in a 
notice requirement when “(1) . . . she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion 
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if 
she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.”  
443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979). 
 65.   See Ann Eileen Driggs, Note, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the Right 
to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687, 694 (2001) (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
424 U.S. 52, 74) (noting that precise definition and consistent application are hard to come by within 
the “mature minor” context). 
 66.   In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   See, e.g., Lisa Anne Hawkins, Note, Living-Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1581, 1588 (1992); Joan-Margaret Kun, Comment, Rejecting the Adage “Children Should Be 
Seen and Not Heard”—The Mature Minor Doctrine, 16 PACE L. REV. 423, 441–44 (1996); Allison 
Mantz, Note, Do Not Resuscitate Decision-Making: Ohio’s Do Not Resuscitate Law Should Be 
Amended to Include a Mature Minor’s Right to Initiate a DNR Order, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 359, 366 
(2003). 
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minor’s right to refuse medical treatment, even absent a statutory mature 
minor exception.  On the other hand, however, state legislatures often do 
not create these statutory mature minor exceptions to refusal of consent 
laws.  These lawmakers obviously know how to create statutory mature 
minor exceptions and they know how to create laws protecting the right to 
refuse medical treatment, yet they choose not to create mature minor 
exceptions on their refusal of consent laws.70  Simon’s Law, passed by the 
Kansas legislature in 2017, presents an illustrative example. 
C. Simon’s Law 
Simon Crosier was born on September 7, 2010.  Shortly after he was 
born, Simon was diagnosed with Trisomy 18, a rare genetic condition 
characterized by the presence of an extra chromosome 18.71  Infants like 
Simon have a mortality risk over 100 times greater than children without 
birth defects—only 5% to 10% of trisomy-18 live births make it to their 
first birthday.72  The children that do survive to enjoy childhood, however, 
may reach a 6–8 month developmental level—they can generally smile 
and recognize family members, often crawl, feed themselves, follow 
simple commands, understand cause and effect, and sometimes even use 
a walker.73  This was the Crosiers’ short-lived hope: Simon died three 
months later.74 
After Simon died, his mother, noticed that his doctor had put a DNR 
order on his medical records shortly after Simon was diagnosed.75  Neither 
Mrs. Crosier nor her husband had consented to the DNR order.  The 
Crosiers were previously unaware that, pursuant to the hospital’s “futility 
policy,” medical professionals would not intervene in the event of a 
cardiac arrest in trisomy-18 patients.76  The hospital effectively decided to 
                                                        
 70.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (Supp. 2017) (permitting minors to object to and bypass 
a parental consent requirement for abortion); S.B. 85, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2017). 
 71.   Jennifer Brinker, ‘Simon’s Law’ Considers Parent’s Role in Health-Care Decisions, ST. 
LOUIS REVIEW (Jan. 28, 2015), http://stlouisreview.com/article/2015-01-28/simons-law-considers. 
 72.   Anna Cereda & John C Carey, The Trisomy 18 Syndrome, 7 ORPHANET J. OF RARE 
DISEASES 1, 5 (2012), available at https://ojrd.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1750-1172-7-81. 
 73.   Id. at 6. 
 74.   Simon Dominic Crosier Obituary, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 5, 2010), 
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/stltoday/obituary.aspx?n=simon-dominic-
crosier&pid=146919141. 
 75.   Brinker, supra note 71. 
 76.   Id.; see also Cereda & Carey, supra note 72, at 5 (“[H]istorically there has been a consensus 
among care providers that trisomy 18 be considered a condition for which non-intervention in the 
newborn was indicated.”) Cereda and Carey also note that surveys show that many physicians would 
still intervene for the parents’ sake.  Id. 
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provide “less than full” medical attention to a patient without consent—
precisely what DNR statutes and policies were intended to prevent.  In 
response to the Crosiers’ story, the Kansas legislature passed “Simon’s 
Law,” which mandates transparency of hospital futility policies and 
ensures that medical professionals cannot unilaterally refuse life-saving 
care for minor patients.77 
While Simon’s Law clearly protects the interests of parents like the 
Crosiers, it also protects the interests of children like Simon who, with 
adequate medical care and a little luck, could defy the odds and live 
relatively long, happy lives.  But by placing the decision about whether to 
refuse medical care solely in the hands of the minor’s parents, states like 
Kansas appear to prevent minors of sufficient maturity from deciding for 
themselves whether to refuse medical treatment. 
It is worth noting that Simon’s Law includes an exception for 
emancipated minors—i.e. parental consent is not required for DNR orders 
if the child is married or otherwise removed from the parents’ custody—
but does not include a general exception for mature minors.78  And as 
Kansas courts remind us, emancipated minors and “mature minors,” for 
the purpose of the mature minor exception, are two different things.79 
Even where Simon’s Law establishes procedures for resolving 
disputes about whether to refuse medical treatment, the law does not 
require that the minor’s desires or opinions be taken into consideration.80  
                                                        
 77.   See S.B. 85, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2017). 
 78.   The relevant portions of Simon’s Law are as follows: 
(b) A do-not-resuscitate order or similar physician’s order shall not be instituted, either 
orally or in writing, unless at least one parent or legal guardian of a patient or resident who 
is an unemancipated minor or prospective patient or resident who is an unemancipated 
minor has first been informed of the physician’s intent to institute such an order and a 
reasonable attempt has been made to inform the other parent if the other parent is 
reasonably available and has custodial or visitation rights. . . . 
(c) Either parent of an unemancipated minor or the unemancipated minor’s guardian may 
refuse consent for a do-not-resuscitate order or similar physician’s order for the 
unemancipated minor, either in writing or orally. Any such refusal of consent must be 
contemporaneously recorded in the patient’s medical record.  No do-not-resuscitate order 
or similar physician’s order shall be instituted either orally or in writing if there has been 
such a refusal of consent except in accordance with a court order issued pursuant to 
subsection (d) [providing procedures for resolving disagreements between parents and 
between parents/medical professionals.]. . . . 
(f) Upon the request of a patient or resident or a prospective patient or resident, a healthcare 
facility, nursing home or physician shall disclose in writing any policies relating to a patient 
or a resident or the services a patient or resident may receive involving resuscitation or life-
sustaining measures, including any policies related to treatments deemed non-beneficial, 
ineffective, futile or inappropriate, within the healthcare facility or agency. 
Kan. S.B. 85, § 1(b)-(c), (f). 
 79.   See In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
 80.   See Kan. S.B. 85. 
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It is safe to assume that adults—whether parents, physicians, or judges—
usually have the minor’s best interests in mind when determining the level 
of care the minor should receive.  Yet this does not mean that a minor’s 
preferences are always upheld, nor does it mean that a minor can 
unilaterally refuse medical treatment (including resuscitation).  And 
whether the Constitution recognizes a minor’s liberty interest in refusing 
medical treatment, or whether Kansas law authorizes a mature minor 
exception is the focus of this Note.  Ultimately, however, neither the 
Constitution nor Kansas common law require a mature minor’s refusal of 
medical treatment to be respected above a parent’s wishes. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In this section, I argue that unemancipated minors have neither a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest nor a Kansas common-law right 
to (unilaterally) refuse unwanted medical treatment.  Proponents of 
applying a mature minor exception to the refusal of medical treatment 
often incorporate the following syllogism: 
1. If an unemancipated minor is capable of mature decision-
making, then he should be able to unilaterally refuse medical 
treatment. 
2. Some minors are capable of mature decision-making. 
3. Therefore, those minors should be able to unilaterally refuse 
medical treatment.81 
There is good reason to question—or at least to prudently refrain from 
adopting—premises (1) and (2).  Despite legal scholars’ citations to 
psychological studies, it is unclear whether (2) is supported by the 
empirical data.  At the same time, there is little support provided for (1) 
besides appeals to the value of autonomy—and the (intrinsic) value of 
autonomy is an open ethical and political question, even within a liberal 
                                                        
 81.   See, e.g., Will, supra note 11, at 259 (“[I]f a minor has sufficient competence to make an 
autonomous decision, that decision should be respected as such.”); Kun, supra note 69, at 442  (citing 
the Midwest Bioethics Center guidelines stating that “(1) a person’s age was not necessarily 
determinative of decision-making capacity; (2) children are not the parents’ property; (3) minors have 
moral status and legal standing independent of their parents’ (4) mature minors should be governed 
by the ethical and legal presumptions of capacity.”); Penkower, supra note 52, at 1204 (“The logical 
justification for employing the mature minor doctrine would seem to be judicial recognition that it is 
possible for some adolescents to attain the faculty for adult-like decision-making . . . [and] ought to 
enjoy the same substantive rights that an adult enjoys while engaging in adult-like activity.”); but see 
Neil C. Manson, Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the 
Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal, 29 BIOETHICS 66 (2015) (arguing for shared decision-
making procedures because of adolescents’ developing, but not fully developed, competence). 
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democratic society.82  This section will examine the merits of these 
premises, concluding that prudence should caution us against treating a 
minor’s decisions with the same deference as an adult’s.  As such, there is 
good reason to reject both the major and minor premises of the above 
syllogism—at least insofar as the law is concerned.  Empirical data about 
minors’ decision-making, as well as social and moral considerations 
surrounding parental and family rights, ultimately tell against a mature 
minor’s freedom—under either the Constitution or under state law—to 
refuse medical treatment.  Once we see a clearer picture of the empirical 
data, as well as a clearer picture of the relationship between parent and 
child, it becomes clear that neither the Constitution nor Kansas law support 
a minor’s right to refuse medical treatment. 
A. Do Minors Have the Same Decision-Making Abilities as Adults? 
The mature minor doctrine depends on whether the decisions of 
minors and the decisions of adults are similar enough that they should be 
given equal deference under the law.  Recall Cruzan, in which the Court 
held that every competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.83  The argument is that at 
least some minors are “competent,” insofar as they have the same decision-
making capacities as adults.  Therefore, proponents argue, mature minors 
should be able to unilaterally refuse medical treatment as well.84 
Whether minors have “mature” decision-making capacities is an 
empirical question.  Scholars regularly look to psychological research to 
justify claims about the cognitive capacities of minors.  As Melinda T. 
Derish and Kathleen Vanden Huevel argue: 
In the last twenty years . . . studies have indicated that “adolescents, with 
some exceptions, are capable of making major health decisions and 
giving informed consent.”  In light of this knowledge, it has become 
increasingly difficult for physicians, lawyers and judges to sustain the 
position that a minor’s actual decision making capacity is legally 
irrelevant, simply because her consent is not legally effective.85 
                                                        
 82.   See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 
173–82 (Oxford University Press 1993) (arguing, contra Joseph Raz, that autonomy has no intrinsic 
value, and only appears to be valuable insofar as one’s autonomy is used to pursue some intelligible 
good). 
 83.   Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
 84.   Michael Branch, Note, A Competent, Terminally Ill Minor’s Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 481, 494–95 (2007). 
 85.   Derish & Vanden Huevel, supra note 11, at 113 (citations omitted). 
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These studies include findings that “the decision-making process of 
fourteen-year-olds is comparable to that of adults.”86 
But the studies citied in support of the proposition that minors are 
capable of mature decision-making actually prove far less than their 
proponents suggest.  Thomas Grisso and Linda Vierling, for example, 
argue that their research shows “no psychological grounds for maintaining 
the general legal assumption that minors at age 15 and above cannot 
provide competent consent.”87 It is not all that surprising that a study 
which examines only a few simple variables—e.g. whether minors (1) 
understand the meaning of words and sentences, (2) have cognitive 
processes that involve rationality and reflection, (3) recognize 
consequences of decisions, and (4) desire to make decisions 
independently—will turn up “no psychological grounds” for treating 
decisions of fifteen-year-olds and twenty-year-olds differently.88  But 
equivalence of maturity does not follow from such limited findings.  
The fact that adolescents understand causality, have theoretical 
knowledge, and desire independence, while relevant, does not by itself 
determine whether adolescents make decisions as well as adults do.  It is 
one thing to select the most reasonable medical treatment for a 
hypothetical patient when you are provided with relevant information.89  It 
                                                        
 86.   Driggs, supra note 65, at 703–04 (citation omitted); see also Hawkins, supra note 69, at 
1588 (“Literature on cognitive development supports this view and indicates that minors are capable 
of exercising sound judgment about medical care earlier than the law generally presumes.” (citations 
omitted)).  The studies themselves do not warrant such a bold conclusion.  For example, the study by 
Lois A. Weithorn and Susan B. Campbell cited by Hawkins recognized differences between the 
“reasonableness” of fourteen-year-olds’ decisions and those of eighteen- and twenty-one-year-olds.  
Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make 
Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1594–96 (1982).  Moreover, Weithorn and 
Campbell note that even the 9-year olds in their study “tended to express clear and sensible treatment 
preferences similar to those of adults,” which seems to negate the significance of the similarities they 
found between the decisions of fourteen-year-olds and those of adults.  Id. at 1596. 
 87.   Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A Developmental 
Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 424 (1978). 
 88.   Id.; see also Brian C. Partridge, The Mature Minor: Some Critical Psychological Reflections 
on the Empirical Bases, 38 J. OF MED. & PHIL. 283, 288 (2013); Driggs, supra note 65, at 714 (2001) 
(citation omitted) (noting that the American Academy of Pediatrics also looks at only a few simple 
factors for competency, including “(1) the ability to understand and communicate information relevant 
to a decision; (2) the ability to reason and deliberate concerning the decision; and (3) the ability to 
apply a set of values to a decision that may involve conflicting elements”).  The problem with this 
approach is obvious.  The Grisso and Vierling study probably also turned up “no . . . grounds” for 
believing that fifteen-year-olds make more dangerous decisions or act more imprudently than do 
adults.  A study’s inability to generate evidence for X (especially due to its limited scope) is not 
grounds for believing ~X (much less for creating a legal presumption of ~X). Grisso & Vierling, supra 
note 87, at 424. 
 89.   See generally Grisso & Vierling, supra note 87 (examining adolescents’ ability to select 
medical treatments for hypothetical patients). 
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is another thing to make a decision about one’s own life and death in one 
of the most emotionally unstable, physically demanding, and 
psychologically trying times in one’s life.90  The studies cited fail to 
address the fact that most patients making a decision about refusing 
medical treatment are in a unique situation: 
Research has shown that chronic or serious illness may leave the minor 
with a feeling of uncertainty about the future and doubt that he will ever 
be happy.  These adolescents are also more likely to develop major 
psychosocial problems than those who are healthy.  Researchers have 
also found that serious or chronic illness has a potential impact on 
developmental tasks during adolescence.  Risk-taking behavior may 
increase, self-esteem may be lowered, emotional difficulties may 
increase, and the sense of personal identity may be compromised.91 
In short, even if many minors can make reasonable hypothetical medical 
decisions about other people, as some psychological studies suggest, when 
such minors are healthy and in a controlled environment, it would be quite 
a leap to assume that they could similarly make mature decisions in 
situations that count.  Even if we take the data produced by the studies 
cited in support of the mature minor doctrine at face value, it would still 
be an unwarranted move to conclude—as often happens in the literature—
“mature minor patients are better able to act in their own interests” than 
their parents.92  More importantly, the emotional difficulties, self-esteem 
issues, and general uncertainty that come with life-threatening disease—
which are heightened during adolescence93—should make us especially 
wary about the dangers of suicide.  It is well-documented that suicide is a 
pressing danger for adolescents, who, for various reasons, are more likely 
to consider ending their lives than adults.94  This suggests that adults and 
minors make decisions differently, and that minors are more prone to make 
decisions that would lead to premature death. 
Of course, adults faced with a decision to continue or forgo medical 
treatment face many of the same challenges as do similarly-situated 
adolescents. And so, the real question, for present purposes, is not whether 
                                                        
 90.   Penkower, supra note 81, at 1192–203 (surveying research on chronically ill adolescents, 
cataloging the unique physical, social, psychological, and developmental challenges they face). 
 91.   Driggs, supra note 65, at 707 (citations omitted). 
 92.   Rosato, supra note 11, at 79. 
 93.   See Penkower, supra note 81, at 1192–1203. 
 94.   See Suicide: Facts at a Glance, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf; see also Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance—United States 2013, 63 SURVEILLANCE 
SUMMARIES 4 (June 13, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6304.pdf. 
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adults and minors have similar cognitive capacities (though that question 
is important and arguably tells against the rights of minors to refuse 
treatment).95  Rather, the real question is whether the law should treat the 
decisions of adults and minors as equivalent.  After all, it is not obvious 
that minors can be trusted to use their cognitive capacities in the way that 
we expect virtuous and competent adults to do.96  A brief look at the risk-
taking behavior of adolescents as compared to adults suggests that, as a 
general rule, they cannot.97  One can grant the premise that many minors 
have the same cognitive capacities and use the same cognitive processes 
as do adults and still deny that minors are (as a rule) competent decision 
makers.98  The studies cited above do not take into account psychological, 
physiological, or emotional maturity; they fail to account for the virtues of 
patience, prudence, courage, and obedience, nor do they account for 
mental, emotional, and social stability—all of which seem immediately 
relevant to the question at hand.  Thus, even if the purported results from 
the oft-cited studies are true, it does not follow that minors will tend to 
exercise their decision-making faculties in a manner equivalent to adults. 
Additionally, psychological evidence may count against the mature 
minor doctrine.  For instance, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons 
found the empirical evidence against adolescents’ maturity and adult-like 
agency too compelling to permit the exercise of the death penalty on 
minors.99  As Mark J. Cherry notes, “the Court concluded that the 
                                                        
 95.   See Jan Brogan, Teen’s Brains Make Them More Vulnerable to Suicide, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE (March 10, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2014/03/09/brain-
development-makes-teens-more-vulnerable-suicide-and-mood-
disorders/tGBStHOnjqAyanfCe7rbsK/story.html. 
 96.   Whether one subscribes to a view of substantive morality which treats such traits as virtues 
or not is irrelevant; I will refer to “virtues” throughout this piece to indicate stable character traits that 
enable people to consistently make prudent and moral decisions, especially in difficult and novel 
situations. 
 97.   See, e.g., Driggs, supra note 65, at 706–07 (citations omitted); see also Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance, supra note 94.  The risk-taking behaviors 
studied by the CDC include “1) behaviors that contribute to unintentional injuries and violence; 2) 
tobacco use; 3) alcohol and other drug use; 4) sexual behaviors that contribute to unintended pregnancy 
and sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection; 
5) unhealthy dietary behaviors; and 6) physical inactivity.” Id. at 2.  Concrete examples of risk-taking 
behaviors include not wearing a seat belt, riding with a driver who had been drinking, driving after 
drinking, texting while driving, fighting, carrying weapons near schools; the study also examined 
frequency of suicides, suicidal thoughts, and sexual violence among teenagers.  Id. at 5–12. 
 98.   Here the term “competent” is used in a normative, legal sense. 
 99.   Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for 
crimes committed by minors). Justice Kennedy, writing the majority, cites Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless 
Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 4, 339 (1992).  
The opinion adopted Arnett’s findings that, due to a variety of factors, minors are more likely to be 
influenced by outside pressure and are less likely to have a well-formed character.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 
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overwhelming weight of the psychological and neurophysiological data 
regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are 
qualitatively different types of agents than adult persons.”100  Even if the 
basic structures of rationality are in place, the brain may nevertheless still 
be developing, even after the age of eighteen.101  Likewise, the fact that 
fifteen-year-olds may have similar cognitive processes and desires for 
independent action does not preclude the fact that they “(1) lack maturity 
and possess an immature sense of responsibility; (2) ‘are more vulnerable 
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure,’; and (3) do not yet possess a fully formed personal character.”102  
This re-emphasizes the point that, regardless of what adolescents may 
possess in terms of cognitive capacities, they may still lack in experience, 
perspective, and virtue.  And of course, this is perfectly consistent with the 
empirical findings that adolescents are more prone to imprudent and 
reckless behavior than adults.103 
There may nevertheless be some “mature minors” out there, whose 
decision-making capacity—i.e. the understanding, cognitive capacity, 
experience, perspective, and virtue—is equivalent to that of an average 
and reasonable adult.  But their undisputed existence does not require 
legislatures and courts to carve out exceptions to their laws, thereby 
permitting their decisions to override those of their parents.  Rather, a 
state’s determination that a parent’s decision is always required when 
available, over and above the decision of someone under the age of 
eighteen, is perfectly reasonable.  After all, the natural rights and 
obligations of parents to ensure the well-being and moral formation of 
their children (see infra Part III.B) do not magically disappear once their 
children become virtuous and good decision-makers.  A state must 
nevertheless determine at which point it will defer to the decisions of an 
individual over his or her parents.  It typically does this (for efficiency’s 
sake, no doubt) by designating a particular age considered appropriate 
within the community, but if a state wishes to diverge from the traditional 
rule, engage in case-by-case analyses, and create mature minor exceptions, 
                                                        
569–70 (citing also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 2014 (2003); ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (W. W. Norton & 
Co. 1968)). 
 100.   Mark J. Cherry, Ignoring the Data and Endangering Children: Why the Mature Minor 
Standard for Medical Decision Making Must Be Abandoned, 38 J. MED. & PHIL. 315, 316 (2013). 
 101.   Id. at 320. 
 102.   Id. at 323 (citations omitted). 
 103.   Supra note 97. 
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it may choose to do so.104  But the decision to refrain from engaging in 
some philosophical and psychological guesswork from the bench is not 
contrary—as some scholars suggest—to “a quarter century of mounting 
scientific and developmental research.”105  Nor would it be an unjust 
affront to the rights of minors to do so.  The mounting scientific and 
developmental research—at least in the eyes of the Supreme Court—
suggests that, because of their developmental, intellectual, and moral 
differences, the law should not treat minors and adults equivalently.106  As 
such, the argument for mature minors’ ability to refuse treatment is more 
difficult to justify. 
B. Should Decisions of “Mature Minors” Be Treated the Same as 
Decisions of Adults? 
Scholars arguing in favor of permitting “mature minors” to 
unilaterally refuse medical treatment often assume that, if a minor is 
deemed “mature,” then his or her decision should be given the same 
amount of deference as an adult’s decision.107  In many cases, it seems as 
if this premise is based on the assumption that a parent is simply a 
                                                        
 104.   One potential problem is that the standards used in case-by-case evaluations are often 
ambiguous.  In Kansas, for example, a minor simply needs to “[be] close to maturity and knowingly 
give[] an informed consent.” Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 
1970).  In addition, Kansas also seems to require that the treatment be in the “best interests of the 
patient.”  Id. at 338.  The problem in the context of refusing medical treatment is that whether medical 
treatment can or should be refused in a given case is an important moral question; by applying the 
“best interests of the patient standard,” the court simply replaces the parents’ answer to this moral 
question with its own.  I find this imposition of values to be problematic, but such impositions are not 
uncommon in American jurisprudence.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976). 
Ambiguity can be found in other states’ standards as well.  In Tennessee, the minor must have “the 
capacity to consent to and appreciate the nature, the risks, and the consequences of the medical 
treatment involved.”  Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 749 (1987).  This seems even more 
ambiguous than the standard used in Kansas; after all, an adolescent may have the capacity to consent 
to and appreciate the nature, the risks, and the consequences without actually appreciating the nature, 
risks, and consequences of the procedure and thereby actually giving informed consent. 
 105.   Rhonda Gay Hartman, Comment, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1267–68 (2000). 
 106.   See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 107.   See e.g., Hawkins, supra note 69, at 1588 (“When the presumption of incompetence breaks 
down, due to the maturity or independence of the minor, autonomy restrictions become harder to 
justify.”). I take this as suggesting that the only or at least primary rationale for parental consent 
requirements is the cognitive incompetence of minors; as if parental consent is simply a form of 
surrogate decision-making.  See also Derish & Vanden Huevel, supra note 11, at 113; Kun, supra note 
69, at 444 (citation omitted) (analyzing an alternate model where parents “were regarded as 
‘consultants’ [whose role should include] assist[ing] the minor to make appropriate decisions by 
providing information and support.”). 
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surrogate decisionmaker because minors are deemed “incompetent”—as 
if this provides the only basis for treating a parents’ decision as binding on 
the minor.  But a minor’s decision-making incompetence is not the only 
basis for prioritizing parents’ decisions over those of their minor children.  
Rather, parents have a pre-political authority over their minor children 
which authorizes them to make decisions on their behalf, regardless of the 
child’s cognitive capacities.108 
Melissa Moschella describes this pre-political moral parental authority 
as follows: 
[T]he nuclear family—parents and their children—is a community that 
is sovereign within its own proper sphere, with reference to the particular 
common good that defines it. . . . [P]arental authority entitles parents to 
the moral space that they need to make decisions on behalf of the family 
community, particularly the members of that community who do not yet 
have sufficient maturity to be able to direct themselves toward their own 
fulfillment.109 
This understanding of parental authority is often lost in the literature.  
Parents are not simply surrogate decision-makers for incompetent 
children.  Rather, the family is a sovereign unit with the parents as its 
governing authority.110  The good of each family member is inherently tied 
up in the common good of the family; a decision affecting the family will 
affect its members, and vice-versa.  It is the parents, not simply members 
capable of adult decision-making, who are charged with safeguarding and 
advancing the common good of all and the personal good of each.  The 
state chooses to protect the natural authority of parents over their children 
until a specified time (usually until the children are eighteen) and it 
generally only interferes with this authority when it is being abused, 
neglected, or endangers members of the family or larger society.111 
                                                        
 108.   Melissa Moschella, Natural Law, Parental Rights and Education Policy, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 
197, 211–12 (2014); see also Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶¶ 2211, 2221, 
www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a4.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) 
(providing a specific, but commonly held, articulation of this view). 
 109.   Moschella, supra note 108, at 212–13. 
 110.   For a fuller articulation of this position, see Robert John Araujo, S.J., Natural Law and the 
Rights of the Family, 1 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 197, 200–02 (2010). 
 111.   See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972) (holding that certain 
compulsory education requirements “interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166–67 (1944) (holding that a state’s interest in the safety and welfare of children protected by child 
labor laws overrides the contrary interest of parents). 
  Of course, the exact age of majority is largely arbitrary—there is nothing magical about the 
age eighteen.  But a state must decide at which point it will respect its citizens’ decisions (for good or 
ill); a perfectly reasonable and simple way to do this is to decide on an age that is in keeping with the 
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This parental authority is a liberty interest protected by the 
Constitution.112  Even if a minor child is competent to make important 
decisions, the parents retain parental authority.113  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that parental authority is not merely limited to that of a 
surrogate decision-maker for incompetent children; rather, they have 
found that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”114  The parents’ 
authority is a moral authority—they are charged with the pursuit of the 
common good of the family as they teach, by example, those in their 
charge to make competent, rational, and virtuous decisions.  The fact that 
one of their children has reached a certain level of cognitive development 
does not abrogate this authority. 
Of course, parents do not always act in the best interests of their 
children.  And the state has the right to exercise its authority as parens 
patriae when parents fail to virtuously exercise their authority.115  This is 
the exception, not the rule; as the Supreme Court reasoned in Parham: 
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization 
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor 
children. . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that 
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity 
for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.  More 
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection 
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.116 
The Court concluded that Supreme Court precedent “permit[s] the parents 
to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role” in decisions regarding 
their children’s psychological and social health and well-being.117 
The issue, then, is not primarily one of competence, but of authority—
namely, whether the parental authority should continue to be recognized 
when parents and their children disagree about whether the child should 
                                                        
social and cultural expectations of its citizens. 
 112.   See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
 113.   See Morrissey v. Perry, 137 U.S. 157, 159 (1890) (holding both that parents have the right 
to veto a minor’s decision to join the military and that mature minors have the capacity to legally bind 
themselves to military service). 
 114.   Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (noting also the parens patriae rights of the State for public policy 
reasons). 
 115.   Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
 116.   Id. at 602 (citations omitted). 
 117.   Id. at 604. 
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accept or refuse medical treatment.118  When a mature minor’s decision is 
given priority over that of the parent, a breakdown of moral authority 
occurs.  If a court, for example, determines that a minor is competent to 
refuse medical treatment against the wishes of her parents, the state has 
effectively usurped authority of the parents—something it is generally 
only permitted to do in cases of abuse, neglect, or substantive and 
compelling public policy.119 
Alternatively, some argue that the government routinely overrides this 
natural authority, thereby suggesting that parental authority counts for 
little in contemporary American jurisprudence.  For example, in Danforth 
and in similar cases that followed, the Court permitted minors to bypass 
parental authority in order to exercise certain liberty interests.120  But it 
does not follow that the Constitution always permits minors to exercise 
their liberty interests, regardless of how much deference a state gives to 
the parents’ natural authority.  After all, Danforth and its progeny are often 
interpreted not as the Court’s affirmation of a minor’s ability to act 
autonomously, without state or parental restraints, but rather as exercises 
of paternalism by the Court.121  Under this interpretation, the question 
before the Court was not whether the good of a minor’s autonomy 
overrides the good of parental authority, but rather whether the “good of 
reproductive health care unquestionably overrides the good of parental 
authority when the two come into apparent conflict.”122  As Barina and 
Bishop put it: 
[T]he real dilemma is not about adolescents’ ability to consent, because 
contraception is perceived as beneficial and good regardless of 
consenting ability.  The real conflict is between state interests in public 
health and parental authority.  Under the guise of the adult-like 
developmental stage of adolescence, health outcomes have clearly been 
prioritized above parental authority and the primacy of the family 
structure without significant attention to what maturity is or if 
adolescents actually possess it.123 
                                                        
 118.   See Tania E. Wright, Comment, A Minor’s Right to Consent to Medical Care, 25 HOW. L.J. 
525, 536 (1982) (noting that “[t]he legitimacy and nature of [parents’] substantive interest[s in their 
children] has produced much debate and confusion”). 
 119.   See Parham, 442 U.S. at 603–04. 
 120.   See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); see also Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (examining the constitutionality of a law requiring two-parent notice 
before a minor obtains an abortion). 
 121.   See, e.g., Rachelle Barina & Jeffrey P. Bishop, Maturing the Minor, Marginalizing the 
Family: On the Social Construction of the Mature Minor, 38 J. MED. & PHIL. 300, 306–07 (2013). 
 122.   Id. at 306. 
 123.   Id. at 307. 
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This is, to be sure, a contentious interpretation.  Yet it cannot be 
doubted that in the cases where the Court or the legislature has overridden 
parental authority, there were other broad, public policy considerations 
beyond simply a minor’s ability to act autonomously.124  After all, many 
such cases require a court to determine that bypassing parental authority 
is in the interest of the child—courts often weigh the risk of disease, 
teenage pregnancies, domestic abuse, and ostracization from family or 
community life against parental authority.125  Such considerations are 
meant to justify bypassing parental authority, which implies that without 
such considerations in play, there is no reason that parental authority 
should be bypassed.126  When examining the ability of minors to refuse 
medical treatment, these considerations rarely, if ever, are present. 
The central premise underlying much argument for the right of 
“mature minors” to refuse medical treatment, therefore, is largely 
unsupported.  Even if minors could exercise the same decision-making 
capacities as could adults, it does not follow that the law ought to give 
their decisions the same weight.  After all, unemancipated minors are, by 
definition, under the care and custody of those with moral authority to 
make decisions on their behalf for their good and the good of the family; 
these decisions are supposed to help guide the minor to develop the virtue, 
character, and practical reason that he may currently lack.  This lack of 
practical reason, broadly construed, is reflected by minors’ tendency to 
engage in riskier behaviors—and the proximity to suicide in refusal-of-
treatment cases should not be ignored.  Permitting a minor’s autonomous 
decision to override this parental authority effectively undercuts its entire 
purpose and function.  With this in mind, a mature minor’s right to refuse 
medical treatment becomes much more difficult to justify. 
                                                        
 124.   See, e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72 (permitting judicial bypass in cases where abortion is 
purportedly in the minor’s interest); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (enforcing 
child labor laws, noting that the material well-being of children may override parents’ religious 
beliefs); but see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241–43 (Douglass, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
adolescents’ religious interests ought to be considered in addition to parental and state interests). 
 125.   See In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074–75 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the risk of physical 
abuse is not the only factor for the court to consider in such cases). 
 126.   It should also be remembered that the “judicial bypass” of parental authority in such cases 
(at least in cases where the minor is not at risk of physical harm through domestic or partner abuse) is 
rather controversial.  After all, the judgment that sexual freedom, sexual health, unwanted pregnancies, 
and other unintended consequences of sexual behavior better promote the well-being of a minor than, 
say, moral and religious rectitude requiring avoiding abortion and contraception is a moral judgment 
traditionally suited for parental, not judicial, authority.  For a court to say that obtaining certain 
material goods and services (e.g. abortion and contraception) is more important than religious and 
moral rectitude, at least in the parents’ reasoned judgment, ought to concern supporters of both 
traditional values and parental authority. 
 
710 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
C. Does a Minor Have a Constitutionally-Protected Interest in Refusing 
Medical Treatment? 
The constitutional argument for a mature minor’s right to refuse 
medical treatment is as follows.  An adult has a protected liberty interest 
in refusing unwanted medical treatment.  A minor has the same liberty 
interests as adults, so long as the minor’s interest outweighs the State’s 
interest in protecting the minor, her parents, and her family.  A minor’s 
interest in obtaining morally controversial medical treatment (e.g. 
abortion) outweighs the State’s interest in protecting the minor, her 
parents, and her family.  Therefore, insofar as refusing medical treatment 
is analogous to obtaining medical treatment—even that as divisive as an 
abortion—a minor has a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in 
refusing medical treatment.127 
Even if this argument is successful, it does not follow that minors will 
actually have the unilateral right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of 
the interests of their parents and the state.  After all, one’s liberty interest 
in any case must be balanced against the state’s interest in preserving life, 
preventing suicide, protecting third-party rights, and upholding the 
integrity of the medical profession.128  The preservation of life, prevention 
of suicide, and the integrity of the medical profession, it seems, are all 
called into question—at least to some degree—by the empirical evidence 
that impressed the Court in Roper.129  After all, if minors are not often 
capable of making prudent and virtuous decisions, there is less reason to 
believe that their refusal of medical treatment would be easily 
distinguishable from suicide. 
It is no consolation to say that only “mature” minors will be exercising 
their decision-making in the refusal of treatment.  In addition to the rather 
murky standards used to determine a minor’s maturity,130 the evidence of 
a minor’s maturity will likely come from periods in the minor’s life that 
are not as emotionally, physically, socially, and morally challenging as 
                                                        
 127.   See Wright, supra note 118, at 540 (arguing for general rights of minors to consent to 
medical care). 
 128.   Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990). 
 129.   Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 130.   See Penkower, supra note 81, at 1175; see also supra note 104.  Whether a doctor or a judge 
would determine a minor’s maturity would depend on whether the mature minor exception is framed 
as judicial bypass—i.e. permitting a minor to seek a judge’s determination that she can consent to or 
refuse medical treatment independent of her parents’ wishes (as in the abortion context)—or as a 
physician’s defense against tort actions filed based on inadequate consent (as in the Kansas common-
law context). 
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when faced with, say, a life-threatening disease.131  Deeming a minor 
mature because of his decision-making and reasoning in more stable 
environments may not inspire great confidence in his ability to exercise 
prudence and virtue in considerably more difficult situations.  When this 
is combined with the well-documented observation that minors are more 
prone to suicide, suicidal thoughts, anxiety, and risk-taking behavior,132 
one can see how Cruzan’s application to minors may be markedly different 
from its application to adults. 
More important for this Note, however, is the impact that a mature 
minor’s right to refuse medical treatment would have on third-parties—
specifically, the parents.  The Court in Cruzan noted that a liberty interest 
will be afforded less protection if its exercise would infringe on the rights 
of third parties.133  Parents have a pre-political, constitutionally-protected 
right to exercise their moral authority over their children and make legally 
binding decisions concerning the children’s and the family’s welfare.134  
As such, a minor’s right to unilaterally refuse medical treatment would 
subvert this moral authority; it would undercut the principle that parents’ 
decisions are the sources of moral formation and for the good of the minor 
and the family as a whole. 
While this consideration was not weighed heavily in Danforth and its 
progeny, Danforth involved situations in which (1) a minor’s access to a 
(purported) substantive and public good was at issue, (2) negative effects 
of seeking parental consent were possible and/or likely, and (3) bypassing 
parental authority was thought to be in the minor’s best interest.135  None 
of these factors are present in the case of a minor’s ability to unilaterally 
refuse medical treatment.  Autonomy is not a substantive good, as it is 
merely the power to direct oneself to what one takes to be good; neither is 
a minor’s exercise of autonomy a public good any more than the minor’s 
obedience to parental authority (unless, of course, that authority is being 
abused or the child is being neglected).  Except in clear cases of abuse or 
neglect, or a failure to act in good faith, it is not clear how a judge might 
determine whether life or unwanted medical treatment is in the best 
interests of the minor.  After all, it is far from clear in any case whether 
death is in one’s interest.  Whether death can be in someone’s interest 
                                                        
 131.   See id. at 1192–1203. 
 132.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance—United 
States 2013, 63 SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 4 (June 13, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
pdf/ss/ss6304.pdf. 
 133.   Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273. 
 134.   See supra Part III.B. 
 135.   Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72–75 (1976). 
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depends on the nature and content of human well-being, which is 
ultimately a moral or religious question.  Because this ultimately would be 
a question about substantive values, and the exercise of the minor’s 
autonomy would not further other public health interests (as it arguably 
does in abortion and contraception cases), a judge has no reason to replace 
the parents’ determination of what the child ought to do with his own.136  
Moreover, the usurpation of parental authority in such a case would neither 
promote life nor prevent suicide, which the state has an interest in doing.  
The Court suggests this much in Hodgson v. Minnesota—that a minor’s 
liberty interest must be weighed against the state’s interest in the minor’s 
welfare, “the interest of the parents, and the interest of the family unit.”137  
It is only when countervailing public policy and public health interests—
as in Danforth—that the states’ interests might be overridden. 
The conclusion, therefore, is that there is no reason to think that a 
minor’s interest in refusing medical treatment is constitutionally protected; 
its protection would require an infringement on the rights of third parties—
i.e. parents—and would, at least arguably, counteract the state’s interest in 
the preservation of life and the prevention of suicide to a much greater 
extent than it did in Cruzan. 
D. Does Kansas Law Protect the Mature Minor’s Refusal of Medical 
Treatment? 
Recall that Kansas law permits adults to refuse medical treatment, and 
that it allows minors to unilaterally consent to medical treatment.138  
However, Kansas law does not and should not permit a minor to refuse 
medical treatment against the parents’ wishes because the refusal of 
medical treatment is not obviously beneficial for the minor, and because 
permitting a minor to do so would depart from the purposes and policy 
justifications of Kansas’ present mature minor exceptions. 
Even if we credit the minor with an ability to understand and 
comprehend the consequences of both treatment and its refusal, it does not 
follow that Kansas law permits minors to refuse medical treatment (absent 
at least one parent’s approval).139  After all, in Younts—as well as most of 
the common-law mature minor cases—the minor consented to a beneficial 
                                                        
 136.   This is not to say that a minor’s access to contraception and abortion are, in fact, substantive 
goods worthy of overriding a parent’s moral judgment.  I take the opposite to be true, but a full 
discussion of that argument is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 137.   497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990). 
 138.   See supra Part II.C. 
 139.   Cf. Grisso & Vierling, supra note 87. 
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medical procedure.140  In addition, in Younts and other cases, the minor 
required immediate medical attention to prevent her condition from 
worsening.141  These factors are not present in the case of a minor’s refusal 
of medical treatment.  It is certainly not clear that the refusal of a 
potentially beneficial medical procedure requires the same amount of 
deference as consent to a potentially beneficial procedure.142  Furthermore, 
the decision to refuse medical treatment is hardly time-sensitive in the 
same way that consenting to a medical treatment may be. 
More importantly, however, we should be aware of the mature minor 
exception’s “mission creep.”143  The exception, as it originated, was 
typically used as a physician’s defense against malpractice and battery 
claims; a doctor was permitted to escape liability for his treatment of a 
minor without parental permission if the minor understood the nature and 
consequences of the procedure.144  As discussed above, the exception was 
also invoked when the traditional requirement of parental consent might 
interfere with public health goals or the material well-being of the 
minor.145  Not until the past few decades has a minor’s autonomy—apart 
from unreasonable physician liability, public health goals, or the minor’s 
material well-being—been considered as an important goal furthered by 
the mature minor exception.146  This recent trend does not reflect the 
purpose of the mature minor exception as it has been recognized in Kansas. 
The common-law mature minor doctrine, as it exists in Kansas, 
certainly does not require a minor’s unilateral decision to refuse medical 
treatment to be respected.  Because the minor’s decision to refuse 
treatment does not protect doctors, and because it furthers neither the 
health of the minor nor the community, it is easily distinguishable from 
Younts and similar cases.  There is no reason to suppose that the mature 
minor exception applies to a minor’s refusal of medical treatment.  
Furthermore, the Kansas legislature has clearly expressed its intent to 
uphold parental authority when it comes to the refusal of medical treatment 
for minors.147  It permitted an exception only to emancipated minors—that 
is, those who are legally outside of the immediate scope of parental 
                                                        
 140.   Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 335–37 (Kan. 1970). 
 141.   Id. 
 142.   See Manson, supra note 81. 
 143.   Barina & Bishop, supra note 121, at 311. 
 144.   Id. at 303. 
 145.   Id. at 305–06. 
 146.   Id. at 311. 
 147.   See S.B. 85, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2017). 
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authority.148  Additionally, it is clear that Kansas legislators know how to 
create a mature minor exception, as they have done so in other 
situations.149  Furthermore, when it comes to disputes about refusing or 
consenting to medical treatment, Kansas lawmakers tend to express a 
preference for continued life and treatment rather than its refusal.150  
Therefore, it seems that recognizing a mature minor’s ability to refuse 
medical treatment would be both an unwarranted expansion of current 
Kansas law, and it would do so contrary to the express intent of the Kansas 
legislature. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Simon’s Law places decisions about refusing medical treatment and 
resuscitation solely within the hands of the parents.  The law arose out of 
a fear that medical professionals might make decisions that violate the 
parents’ right to make decisions for the good of their family and their 
children.151  But the law also precludes minors from unilaterally deciding 
whether to refuse treatment and resuscitation.  Scholars have argued that 
such preclusion is unjustified—that it is an arbitrary affront to a mature 
person’s autonomy which ought not to exist.152  But this position only 
makes sense if the minor in question is as competent a decision-maker as 
are adults and that parents only make decisions for their children because 
the children are incompetent.  The purpose of this Note is to show that 
these assumptions are unwarranted. 
There is no reason to think that either the Constitution or Kansas law 
does or should protect the right of a minor to refuse medical treatment 
against the wishes of her parents.  I am not, however, suggesting that a 
state cannot exercise its parens patriae right to protect children from abuse 
and neglect, and such cases of abuse and neglect may become apparent in 
disputes about medical care.  Parents have the inherent moral authority to 
make decisions for the good of their children and the family; it is only 
                                                        
 148.   Id. 
 149.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (Supp. 2017) (permitting minors to object to and bypass a 
parental consent requirement for abortion). 
 150.   See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,106 (2002) (noting that a patient’s present desire to 
undergo treatment always supersedes the effects of a declaration directing the withholding of medical 
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 151.   Brinker, supra note 71. 
 152.   See, e.g., Derish & Vanden Huevel, supra note 11; Rosato, supra note 11; Will, supra note 
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when they fail in their duties that the state may exercise its parens patriae 
rights.  And minors within the care of their parents are bound by the just 
exercise of the parents’ moral authority, even when they disagree or would 
act otherwise.  This moral authority is more than a mere decision-making 
surrogacy for incompetent children; it is supposed to guide and shape 
minors into virtuous and prudent citizens and human beings.  It would be 
unwise to usurp this authority simply because a minor with adult-like 
cognitive capacities disagrees with her parents’ decision. 
